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Assessment of change in behavioral functioning in children as a function of neurotoxicity is not a trivial undertaking. Psychological tests, widely
(though erroneously) considered to be the "gold standard" for measurement of behavior in humans, are not adequate for the task; they tap the
structure of cognition, not the behavioral repertoire, and cannot (alone) address developmental change. Comprehensive neurobehavioral assess-
ment must be undertaken within a multidisciplinary assessment strategy incorporating knowledge of brain and brain development, cognitive
processes and their development, brain-behavior relationships, and detailed knowledge of neurotoxicants, their action and the exposure thereto.
Initial assessment batteries must be adequately broad ranging and must incorporate strategies and data for evaluating the impact of predictable non-
brain variables; they must also be cost efficient to respond to the realities of funding and the exigencies of field testing. Measures of neuropsycho-
logical outcome are optimally characterized as they relate to behavioral domains specified in terms of the competencies of infants and children of
different ages; relevant information is derived from demographic, socioeconomic, medical, developmental, and educational sources, as well as from
detailed observational data and performance on psychological tests. Two levels of assessment are proposed. - Environ Health Perspect 102(Suppl
2):141-144 (1994).
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Introduction
Toxins do not affect behavior-at least,
not directly. Toxins have their impact on
brain. Brain is the necessary, though not a
sufficient, substrate for behavior (1). In the
adult, with a (presumably) well-differenti-
ated brain, the relationship of brain to
behavior is essentially one of "where": dif-
ferent brain systems support relatively dis-
crete aspects of behavior. The impact of
toxins in the adult, then, may well be seen
at the level of more or less clearly definable
cognitive functions or processes. The
assessment of toxic agent impact on adult
functioning can thus focus, at least ini-
tially, on the detection ofchange in cogni-
tive functions/processes.
In the child, however, toxins do not
simply "hit" a given system, the "where";
they hit a "what" at both a "where" and a
"when" (2). Thus, the hit might be on
processes such as cell migration, prolifera-
tion, aggregation or differentiation, or
synaptogenesis or myelination; it might
involve system A or system B; it might be
at 12 days postconception or at 3 months
postuterine life-or at 6, or 15 years of age.
Each or all of these hits may have its own
particular signature in behavior. In the
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child, whose behavioral repertoire is devel-
oping, toxins can have deleterious impact
on both specific cell groups or brain struc-
tures, the "where," and on the building of
systems over time, the "what" and the
"when." The assessment of behavioral
change secondary to toxic agent exposure
in the child must take account these devel-
opmental interactions.
Once the system is built, the relation-
ship between brain and (at least, subsets of)
behavior appears to be specified, relatively
speaking. Given neural substrates are asso-
ciated with (more or less) specifiable cogni-
tive functions or processes. These can be
tapped by means ofpsychological tests (3).
The Limitation of
Psychological Testing
The term "psychological tests" refers to
one ofthe primary products ofthe empiri-
cist tradition in psychology, that is, learn-
ing and psychometric theory, as manifest in
IQ and other standardized tests. In the
context of the present discussion the his-
tory ofsuch tests, and their development, is
of note. First, such tests were developed
without reference to the underlying brain
that mediates the behavior in question.
Over the early and middle decades of this
century, psychologists struggling to validate
their emerging discipline as "scientific" and
"objective" in the physics-defined zeitgeist
of the day explicitly eschewed the brain in
favor of objectively definable cognitive
functions. Tests were developed to demon-
strate the structure ofcognition, not brain.
The cognitive functions delineated in
humans were typically based on the func-
tioning ofthe usual experimental animal of
cognitive psychologists ofthe time, the col-
lege student, who, for the purposes of this
discussion, is presumed to have a mature
adult brain. However, it is by no means
obvious that what constitute the compo-
nents of the adult cognitive architecture,
fully developed, are-at any given epoch-
the same, or in the same relationship to
each other, in the developing child.
Thus, the tools that psychology has
developed to measure behavior-psycho-
logical tests-are limited in their applica-
tion (at least, standing alone) to the
problem of evaluating behavior change in
the child. The cognitive architecture ofthe
child is not a priori comparable to that of
the adult; it differs from that of the adult,
and differs differently, at different develop-
mental periods. Furthermore, psychological
tests tap behaviors "cross-sectionally,"
when applied to both adults and children.
The theory governing them and their use
does not, nor does it need to, incorporate
concepts ofdevelopment. But, in the devel-
oping child, the impact of toxic agents
affect behavior across time.
To date, the preferred outcome mea-
sures for toxic agent impact studies in chil-
dren have been IQ and academic
achievement testing. The basic question
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has been framed in terms of IQ change or
"learning disabilities." There are many
problems with this as a strategy.
First, ifthere is no change in either IQ
or achievement performance in the context
of a suspected toxic agent exposure we
know essentially nothing. Given the limita-
tions of these tools as measures of "brain"
(the level at which the toxins are presumed
to act), a lack ofchange in IQ or academic
achievement measures does not by any
means rule out an effect ofa given toxin. A
toxic agent could, for example, derail the
development ofbehavioral regulatory func-
tion, that is, the child's ability to indepen-
dently organize his moment-to-moment
behavior. This is all too frequently not evi-
dent under the well-structured conditions
offormal testing. It could nonetheless give
rise over the long term-under the "free
field" conditions of real life-to school
dropout, lack of employment, severe emo-
tional distress, and possibly contact with
the law. Potentially, all these effects may be
very costly to society as well as to the indi-
vidual.
A second problem is that it is by no
means clear that learning disabilities can be
diagnosed by IQ and achievement scores
alone; they can be present even though
scores and/or score profiles are not particu-
larly discriminative. Under such conditions
a broader based examination of cognitive
skill profiles typically is needed.
A third problem is that IQ tests simply
do not "cover the ballpark": they only tap
part of the skills repertoire. Take the lan-
guage domain: an adequate score on Verbal
IQ measures, for example, is often taken to
indicate adequate language competence,
but Verbal IQ taps verbal knowledge, not
necessarily language facility (4). These can
be dissociated either positively or nega-
tively. Even language tests only yield infor-
mation about portions of the language
domain; they do not determine how effec-
tively language is used. Tests in general
yield information about the structure of
cognition, but they do not characterize the
way in which cognitive skills or processes
are deployed in actual "behaving."
An IQ and achievement test strategy
cannot address the source of change when
change is present. Ifthere is change on IQ
and achievement measures, we only know
that there is change, we do not know what
causes the change in psychological terms,
nor do we know that the toxic agent under
suspicion is responsible. Nor do we know if
the source is "cognitive" or "toxic."
Multiple social, cultural, economic, demo-
graphic, genetic, familial, or caretaking fac-
tors can influence behavioral outcome in
humans (5). Further information will be
needed about cognitive performance, about
the action of and exposure to suspected
toxic agents, and about psychosocial and
demographic variables. An assessment that
does not include the relevant information
related to both brain and nonbrain vari-
ables which might impact on behavioral
outcome is not cost efficient, especially
considering the cost, in energy, time,
money, and resources of merely mounting
a research studywith children.
Fifth, individual tests and test batteries
also have their limitations. All tests are only
as good as their construct validity in tap-
ping the needed domains, and the quality
of their standardization. And data based
only, or primarily, on tests also has the
problem of being time locked; normative
standards are fixed in time while the organ-
ism is changing.
In summary, what are widely thought
to be the "measurement tools" of psychol-
ogy will not suffice to assess the possible
impact of toxic agent exposure on behav-
ior. In and of themselves, psychological
tests do not "measure" in a formal fashion;
they do not measure brain; they cannot
address developmental change. However,
they are perfectly good as "tools"; it is only
when the tools become viewed as the be-all
and end-all of the game that they fail.
Unfortunately in psychology, and particu-
larly where the educational psychology
establishment has been concerned, the
tools are dangerously close to becoming the
end in themselves: the tail is wagging the
dog. However, psychological testing is not
psychological assessment (6). Psycho-
logical testing can only tap cognitive func-
tions; it takes psychological assessment to
evaluate a person, or a person's brain.
The Importance of
Assessment
What then is psychological or neu-
ropsychological assessment? A comprehen-
sive assessment of a person requires
consideration ofall (or as many as possible)
of the variables that might impinge on an
individual and affect the way he or she
behaves. Neuropsychologically, and where
children are concerned, it requires that we
evaluate potential changes in the whole
repertoire of behavior that the human
brain normally manifests across develop-
ment. But by no means are all of these
behaviors directly brain-related. The
impact of experience and the environment
on the development of behavioral compe-
tence is well documented in the neurosci-
entific, psychological and sociological liter-
atures. I would argue that the primary goal
of neuropsychological assessment, both in
the clinical context and in the field-espe-
cially when one is working with children-
is not, in some sense, to "rule in" brain, but
to rule out all of the nonbrain possibilities
that might account for a given behavioral
outcome before suggesting that we might
knowwhat aparticular brain-behavior rela-
tionship might be at anygiven age.
In assessment, then, psychological test
performance is one, but only one, ofa vari-
ety of outcome measures that will be
needed; psychological tests are necessary,
but not sufficient. To assess the potential
impact of toxic agents on the developing
brain and on behavior, an assessment strat-
egy will be needed. This must be based on
a (admittedly beginning) theory of neu-
robehavioral development in humans,
incorporating what we know of brain, of
the development of brain, of behavioral
processes and their development, of brain-
behavior relationships in both developing
and adult human and nonhuman animals,
and of nonbrain contributions to behav-
ioral competence.
From this perspective, it will clearly
take more, rather than less, to assess the
possible impact oftoxic agents on children.
However, the assessment of possible envi-
ronmental toxicity takes place in a sociopo-
litical context; there are some realities that
cannot be ignored. There are notable limi-
tations on what a small member ofsociety
will tolerate in terms of sustained assess-
ment (even with breaks). There are by no
means insignificant limitations on what
bigger members of society (the research
team) think is reasonable to do, or can real-
istically manage, "in the field." There are
even greater limitations on what major
societal institutions are willing to fund,
even for the good oftheir littlest members
and their future. Not only are there limited
funds and many claimants, but in many
instances society as a whole puts a high
value on the products whose manufacture
may lead to environmental toxicity. There
arewidelyvarying views ofthe cost- benefit
ratios so entailed.
However, we already know that toxins
can be damaging to the human animal.
The costs ofsuch damage to the individual
and to society can be very high indeed, not
only in terms ofemotional stress and fiscal
strain for an impaired youngster and his or
her family, but also in terms ofspecialized
medical care, early interventions, special
educational services, loss of adult produc-
tivity, need for sheltered work opportuni-
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ties, Social Security benefits, to name a few;
such costs are borne by society as a whole.
For example, $150,000 is not an unusual
cost for the initial medical care of a low
birth weight premature infant, that is,
before his or her first discharge from the
hospital.
In terms of implementation, also, it is
not cost efficient to do only the minimum,
intervention possible especially when very
detailed questions are already being asked
and children need to be assessed to allow
researchers to answer those questions
coherently. As all developmental
researchers can report, it takes so much
organization, effort, funds and energy sim-
ply to mount an assessment of children at
all, that it would be particularly foolhardy
not to do enough to answer all the neces-
sary questions. IQ and achievement tests
are not enough theoretically, nor do they
alone make practical sense. We can hardly
afford not to implement a coherent assess-
ment strategy ifwe are going to do it at all.
The Alternative Strategy
Ifperformance on tests is not the opti-
mal end point for developmental behav-
ioral assessment, what is? Behavioral
domains. A behavioral-domains approach
has several significant advantages.
Behavioral domains, adequately specified,
can be tapped at all relevant ages, with tests
appropriate to the developmental compe-
tencies of the target animal (7). Using the
language domain as an example, it is
impossible to determine mean length of
utterance to tap the language competence
of a 10-day-old infant, but it is feasible to
evaluate whether the child is attempting to
engage its caretakers in a reciprocal interac-
tion-a critical foundation for commu-
nicative competence. The emphasis is on
the use to be made ofthe skill, not on the
skill itself.
The adequately specified behavioral
domain is also a crucial pivot between ani-
mal and human research. In conjunction
with detailed knowledge ofthe neural sub-
strates for human and nonhuman behav-
iors, specific behavioral domains have been
tapped with formally comparable tasks in
developing and adult humans and nonhu-
man primates, with and without lesions
(surgical and "natural") (8,9), and with
species-relevant tasks hypothesized to be
functionally or behaviorally equivalent in
nonprimate animals (10).
A behavioral-domains strategy also pro-
vides for principled data reduction in two
regards. First, a major factor in assessing
both the scientific validity and the cost effi-
ciency ofa proposed study relates to statis-
tical power: how many subjects are needed
to permit valid assessment of how many
data points? Set up costs, subject availabil-
ity and attrition limit the size ofcohorts for
analysis. Using competency within behav-
ioral domains as the unit of analysis facili-
tates examination ofoutcome with smaller
subject groups. Second, the actual measures
selected to characterize a given domain can
be chosen for their optimal match with the
competencies ofthe organism at the age in
question. Analysis is conducted by behav-
ioral domain, not by specific test or evalua-
tion technique.
Behavioral domains also have the
advantage of continuing to be relevant.
Psychological tests "wear out," that is, their
normative data become outdated. A behav-
ioral-domains approach permits "old" data
to be used, and to be integrated with the
products of ongoing research in brain-
behavior relationships and associated test
or technique development.
Perhaps the most important contribu-
tion ofthe behavioral-domains approach is
in its ability to provide comparable data
over time. This allows the construction of
an enduring database or registry to permit
evaluation and tracking not only of the
impact oftoxicity but also ofthe efficacy of
our response to it. In a funding climate
that is not at present conducive to longitu-
dinal research this is particularly important.
So, what will the assessment strategy
require? Clearly, it cannot be based solely
on neurobehavioral assessment. Neuro-
behavioral assessment cannot stand alone as
an outcome measure: one cannot simply
measure without reference to what one is
measuring, when, and in whom. The over-
all enterprise will need to be multi-discipli-
nary with contributions from (at the very
least) toxicology, developmental neuro-
science, experimental psychology, clinical
medicine, adult and developmental neu-
ropsychology, and biostatistics.
What is the neurobehavioral compo-
nent ofthis larger strategy then? As in toxic
exposure research with adults, cost effi-
ciency requires a two-step approach: the
first, to ask the question: is there an effect?
the second: what is its source psychologi-
cally or toxicologically? The following dis-
cussion is based on the assumption that, for
any given proposed study, there is a suffi-
ciently high "index of suspicion" to war-
rant an investigation of children
themselves. Given the exigencies of field
testing (with specific reference to the likeli-
hood ofcooperation and motivation on the
part of both target individual and con-
trols), it makes no sense to mobilize the
resources needed to get children scheduled
for testing and then only perform a screen-
ing-battery (assuming that the goal of
"screening" is brevity in testing). Where
the goal is indeed to screen, rather than to
assess a risk that is more-or-less well-
defined, a well designed developmental
questionnaire and interview with the pri-




Beyond the initial screening level, the
neurobehavioral assessment strategy for
children is based on the following. First-
level assessment batteries should have as
their primary goals that they be sufficiently
broad ranging, that they incorporate strate-
gies and relevant data for evaluating the
impact of predictable nonbrain variables,
and they be cost-efficient. First-level batter-
ies are only targeted with respect to the age
groups (and language group, where applic-
able) ofthe target populations.
First-level assessment batteries address
domains of functioning subsumed under
executive control processes, skills/knowl-
edge bases, and achievement (academic,
social, societal). Relevant data are derived
from a two-component evaluation proce-
dure in which data are obtained separately
from the child and from his or her caretak-
ers (familial, medical, and educational).
Information will be obtained from the
child by means of diagnostic interview,
administration of tests, and behavioral
observations. The relative contributions of
these elements will vary as a function of
age. Information obtained from caretakers
will be by means of structured interviews
and the completion (oral or written) of
questionnaires and inventories. These latter
may be collected in face-to-face conversa-
tion or by telephone contact.
This type ofassessment strategy can be
optimally undertaken in the field with con-
current data collection by a two-person
research team one to interview/test the
child, one to interview the caretaker.
The data to be obtained from the child
provide information relevant to the follow-
ing domains: behavioral regulation, atten-
tional capacities, learning skills, memory
capacities, problem-solving skills, motor
skill (gross, fine, graphomotor), sensory
capacities, general cognitive ability (a full
intelligence battery is neither needed, nor a
justifiable use of time) communicative
competence/language abilities, visuospatial
processing, social cognition, socio-emo-
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tional status/adjustment, and, academic
achievement.
These domains are tapped by direct
physical and neurological examination of
the child, administration of formal tests in
standard form, detailed observational data
of both "free field" (caretakers), and psy-
chological testing behaviors. Outcome mea-
sures at this level include achievement of
developmental milestones, standardized test
scores, performance relative to controls on
specific cognitive measures, and scores on
behavioral inventories.
Information obtained from caretakers
by questionnaire and interviews will include
data about the child's family pertaining to
family circumstances (cultural background,
education, vocational and economic status)
and to family history (medical, neurologi-
cal, psychiatric condition); and data about
the child, including birth history, achieve-
ment of developmental milestones
(motor/sensory, cognitive, social, emo-
tional), medical, psychological, and educa-
tional history. Additional data will be
obtained from behavioral rating scales and
social skills and personality inventories to
address behavioral regulation competencies
(state maintenance, motor and verbal activ-
ity levels, arousal, deployment ofattention,
etc., as appropriate for age), problem-solv-
ing skills, social skills/peer interaction, and
emotional status, as well as vulnerability to
psychiatric disorder. The potential impact
of different cultural expectations, home
environments and caretaking styles is evalu-
ated by appropriate measures in these
domains.
A comprehensive assessment within this
framework is estimated to take a maximum
of3 to 4 hrs oftesting, with even the most
competent child (who is likely to be able to
do most). The primary caretaker is inter-
viewed at the same time. Given the neces-
sary information obtained, this compares
favorably with the estimated 2 hr that is
typically needed for the IQ-and-achieve-
ment-test strategy.
It is important to emphasize in this type
ofstrategy that not all behaviors at all ages
are most economically tapped by tests. In
addition to questionnaires and inventories
with caretakers, behavioral ratings, observa-
tional paradigms and reliability judgments
of both behaviors and diagnostic categories
can also be used in assessing the children's
functioning. Psychology certainly does not
lack for a wealth of well- standardized
instruments ofthese types with appropriate
controls for predictable biases in examiners,
judges, or interviewees.
As in all behavioral research, specific proce-
dures will need to be deployed for assessing
and maintaining reliability in test adminis-
tration, scoring and coding of data, data
entry, etc., as well as for controlling bias in
data collection.
In contrast to first-level assessment, sec-
ond-level batteries are highly targeted. They
build on first-level assessment data, but
their primary goals are to address questions
ofspecificity, sensitivity, and causation with
respect to the relationship oftoxic agent to
a behavioral change identified by the first-
level assessment. As such they explore one
or more behavioral domains in depth. To
answer specific questions, second-level bat-
teries zero in on specific populations at risk;
they are designed with knowledge of the
suspected neurotoxicant, its mode ofaction
and predilection for different brain systems
and/or processes, and the timing, amount
and duration ofexposure to it. Second-level
batteries should incorporate knowledge of
the brain-behavior relationships of the
neural structures or systems thus impli-
cated; the development of both neural
structures and the behaviors they subserve;
and measurement techniques appropriate to
tap the cognitive processes and functions
involved.
Finale
As can be seen, there is no single battery
for evaluating the potential impact of toxic
agents on the developing child. I cannot
recommend any specific tests in this
endeavor; many are appropriate. Overall
strategy, a principled theoretical framework,
and adequately specified behavioral
domains are what count, not tests.
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